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a b s t r a c t
Forensic analysis requires the acquisition and management of many different types of
evidence, including individual disk drives, RAID sets, network packets, memory images,
and extracted files. Often the same evidence is reviewed by several different tools or
examiners in different locations. We propose a backwards-compatible redesign of the
Advanced Forensic Formatdan open, extensible file format for storing and sharing of
evidence, arbitrary case related information and analysis results among different tools.
The new specification, termed AFF4, is designed to be simple to implement, built upon the
well supported ZIP file format specification. Furthermore, the AFF4 implementation has
downward comparability with existing AFF files.
ª 2009 Digital Forensic Research Workshop. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Storing and managing digital evidence is becoming increas-
ingly more difficult, as the volume and size of digital evidence
increases. Evidence sources have also evolved to include
data other than disk images, such as memory images,
network images and regular files. Preserving such digital
evidence is an important part of most digital investigations
(Carrier and Spafford, 2004), and managing the evidence in
a distributed organization is now emerging as a critical
requirement.
This paper presents a framework for managing and storing
digital evidence. We first examine existing evidence
management file formats and outline their strengths and
limitations. We then explain how the proposed Advanced
Forensics Format (AFF4) framework extends these efforts into
a universal evidence management system. The detailed
description of the AFF4 proposal is then followed by concrete
real world use cases.
1.1. Prior work
In recent years there has been a steady and growing interest in
the actual file formats and containers used to store digital
evidence. Early practitioners created exact bit-for-bit copies
(commonly referred to as ‘‘dd images’’). More recently,
proprietary software systems for making and authenticating
‘‘images’’ of digital evidence have become common (e.g. B.S.
NTI Forensics Source, 2008; Ilook investigator, 2008; Guidance
Software, Inc., 2007). PyFlag (Cohen, 2008a) introduced
a ‘‘seekable gzip’’ format that allowed disk images to be stored
in a form that was compressed but allowed random access to
evidence data necessary for forensic analysis.
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The Expert Witness Forensic (EWF) file format was origi-
nally developed for Encase (Guidance Software, Inc., 2007), but
then adopted by other vendors (Kloet et al., 2008). The EWF file
format similarly compresses the image into 32 kb chunks
which are stored back to back in groupings inside the file. The
format employs tables of relative indexes to the compressed
chunks to improve random access efficiency. EWF volumes
have a maximum size limit of 2 Gb and therefore usually split
an image across many files. EWF provides for a small number
of predefined metadata fields to be stored within the file
format.
The Advanced Forensic Format (AFF) expanded on this idea
with a forensic file format that allowed both data and arbitrary
metadata to be stored in a single digital archive (Garfinkel
et al., 2006).
Both the AFF and EWF file formats are designed to store
a single image, and any metadata that implicitly refers to that
image such as sector size and acquisition date. Unlike EWF,
AFF employed a system to store arbitrary name/value pairs for
metadata, using the same system for both user-specified
metadata and for system metadata, such as sector size and
device serial number. For example, Aimage, the AFF hard disk
acquisition tool, not only stores the image, but additionally
stores a description of the tool itself, the version of AFFLIB
used to create the image, the computer on which the image
was made, the operator of the tool, the user supplied param-
eters supplied to the tool.
Schatz proposed a Sealed Digital Evidence Bags architecture,
facilitating composition of evidence and arbitrary evidence
related information, through a simple data model and globally
unique referencing scheme (Schatz and Clark, 2006).
1.2. This paper
An important advance of this work is the introduction of
storage transformation functions to the forensic storage
container. Prior works simply focused on forensically sound
storage of bit-streams, leaving the necessary activities of
translating low level storage into higher level abstractions at
the aggregate block (i.e. RAID), volume, and filesystem layers
in the domain of analysis tools, as transiently constructed
artifacts. In contrast AFF4 has mechanisms for describing
transformation in a flexible and concise way, allowing users to
view multiple transformations of the same data with little
additional storage cost. This mechanism is an important
enabler for inter-operable forensic tools. For example, carved
files may be described in terms of their block allocation
sequences from an image, rather than requiring the carved file
to be copied again.
This paper extends previous work on the Advanced
Forensic Format (AFF) by taking many of the concepts devel-
oped and designing a new specification and toolset. The AFF4
format is a complete redesign of the architecture. The new
architecture is capable of storing multiple heterogeneous data
types that might arise in a modern digital investigation,
including data from multiple data storage devices, new data
types (including network packets and memory images),
extracted logical evidence, and forensic workflow. The AFF4
format extends the format to make it the basis of a global
distributed evidence management system.
We call the new system AFF4, and use the phrase AFF1 to
refer to the legacy system developed by Garfinkel et al.1 The
publicly released AFF4 implementation, is able to read existing
AFF files.
2. The need for an improved forensic format
AFF1’s flexibility came from a data model of forensic data and
metadata stored as arbitrary name/value pairs called
segments. For example, the first 16 MB of a disk image is stored
in a segment called page0, the second 16 MB in a segment
called page1, etc. Because of this flexibility, it was relatively
easy to extend AFF1 to support encryption, digital signatures,
and the storage of new kinds of metadata such as chain-of-
custody information (Garfinkel, 2009).
2.1. AFF limitations
We observed a number of practical problems in the underlying
AFF1 standard and Garfinkel’s AFFLIB implementation:
 While AFF1’s design stores a single disk image in each
evidence file, modern digital investigations typically involve
many seized computers or pieces of media.
 The data model of AFF1 enabled storing metadata related to
the contained image as (property, value) pairs. This data
model does not, however, support expressing arbitrary
information about more than one entity.
 AFF1 has no provision for storing memory images or inter-
cepted network packets.
 AFF1 has no provisions for storing extracted files that is
analogous to the EnCase ‘‘Logical Evidence File’’ (L01)
format, or for linking evidence to web pages.
 AFF1’s encryption system leaks information about the
contents of an evidence file because segment names are not
encrypted.
 AFF1’s default compression page size of 16 MB can impose
significant overhead when accessing NTFS Master File
Tables (MFT), as these structures tend to be highly frag-
mented on systems that have seen significant use.
 Although the AFF1 specification calls for a ‘‘table of
contents’’ similar to the Zip (Katz, 2007) ‘‘central directory’’
that is stored at the end of AFF files, Garfinkel never
implemented this directory in the publicly released AFF1
implementation, AFFLIB. As a result, every header of every
segment in an AFF file needs to be read when a file is opened.
In practice this can take up to 10–30 s the first time a large
AFF file is opened.
 AFF1’s bit-level specification is essentially a simple
container file specification. Given that there are other
container file specifications that are much more widely
supported with both developer and end-user tools, it
seemed reasonable to migrate AFF from its home-grown
format to one of the existing standards.
1 Although Garfinkel never changed the AFF bit-level specifica-
tion, Garfinkel released AFFLIB implementations with major
version numbers 1, 2 and 3. We therefore call our system AFF4 to
avoid confusion.
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2.2. Global distributed evidence management
While AFF1 was designed for use on a single machine that
could both image evidence and perform analysis, many
modern practitioners work in distributed environments in
which imaging and analysis takes place in multiple locations
and is performed by multiple individuals.
Global distributed evidence management requires more
than simply tracking the movement of disk images: it requires
approaches for sharing evidence to multiple disconnected
evidence, allowing offline work, and then seamlessly recom-
bining the work products of the analysts in a third security
domain.
Managing evidence in a globally distributed system
requires the use of globally unique identifiers to ensure no
name collisions can occur with disconnected locations. AFF1
assigns each piece of evidence a unique 128-bit identifier
called a GID but did not make it clear when this identifier
should be changed and when it should remain the same.
Consider the typical usage scenario depicted in Fig. 1, of
a volume containing a disk image. This volume is distributed
to two independent analysts, Alice and Bob. Alice may find
and extract individual files, while Bob may correlate infor-
mation in the evidence file with other data that is available on
departmental servers. Although in some environments Alice
and Bob may be able to work on a shared file that is located on
a server, in other environments there will not be sufficient
connectivity. Instead, each analyst will be required to store
the information in their own evidence file; these files will then
be recombined at a later point in time.
In this case they can each create a new volume which
extends the original volume and save their analysis on this
new volume. Now they only need to share this new volume
with other analysts who also have a copy of the old volume to
interchange their findings.
This is made possible because each volume is indepen-
dent of one another, but is still viewed as part of a bigger
evidence set.
3. Introducing AFF4
This section discusses the AFF4 terminology and architecture.
The AFF4 design is object oriented, in that a few generic
objects are presented with externally accessible behavior. We
discuss a number of implementations of these high level
concepts and show how these can be put together in common
usage cases.
 An AFF Object is the basic building block of our file format. AFF
Objects have a globally unique name (URN) as described in
(Sollins and Masinter, 1994; Fielding, 1995, Hoffman et al.,
1998). The name is defined within the aff4 namespace, and is
made unique by use of a unique identifier generated as per
RFC4122 (Leach et al., 2005).
 A Relation is a factual statement which is used either to
describe a relationship between two AFF Objects, or to
describe some property of an object. The relation comprises
of a tuple of (Subject, Attribute, Value). All metadata is
reduced to this tuple notation.
 An Evidence Volume is a type of AFF Object which is responsible
for providing storage to AFF segments. Volumes must provide
a mechanism for storing and retrieving segments by their
URN. We discuss two volume implementations below,
namely the Zip64 based volume and the Directory based volume.
 A stream is an AFF Object which provides the ability to seek
and read random data. Stream objects implement abstracted
storage, but must provide clients the stream like interface.
For example, we discuss the Image stream used to store large
images, the Map stream used to create transformations and
the Encrypted stream used to provide encryption.
 A segment is a single unit of data written to a volume. AFF4
segments have a segment name provided by their URN,
a segment timestamp in GMT, and the segment contents.
Segments are suitable for storing small quantities of data,
and still present a stream interface.
 A Reference is a way of referencing objects by use of
a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI). The URI can be another
AFF Object URN or may be a more general Uniform Resource
Locator (URL), such as for example a HTTP or FTP object.
This innovation allows objects in one volume to refer to
objects in different volumes, facilitating data fusion and
cross referencing.
 The Resolver is a central data store which collects and resolves
attributes for the different AFF Objects. The Resolver has
universal visibility of objects from all volumes, and therefore
guides implementations in resolving external references.
4. Metadata and the universal resolver
Management of evidence requires an effective identification,
with practitioners currently employing acquisition time met-
adata such as case identifiers and description fields in the EWF
file format; file and directory naming schemes, and labeling of
evidence container hard drives. Evidence may also be refer-
enced by external means in an inconsistent way. For example,
in an investigator’s case note a disk image may be referred to
Fig. 1 – A typical usage scenario. Both Alice and Bob receive
an AFF volume but work independently. Rather than
modifying the volume, they each create their own local
volumes and save their results into those files. They can
now exchange the smaller new volumes and effectively
merge their results into the same AFF set when they are
finished.
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by the name of the suspect (e.g. Joe’s hard disk), the case
number or dates.
Such individuation schemes may be problematic when
automatically managing evidence. For example, at acquisition
time a suitably unique individuator may not be selected. If
that occurred, at analysis time evidence container files may
need to be renamed to avoid name collisions.
The AFF4 design adopts a scheme of globally unique
identifiers for identifying and referring to all evidence. We
define an AFF4 specific URN scheme, which we call the AFF4
URN. URN’s of this scheme use the namespace (Sollins and
Masinter, 1994) ‘‘aff4’’ and therefore begin with the string
‘‘urn:aff4’’. AFF4 URNs are then be made unique by use of
a unique identifier generated as per RFC4122 (Leach et al.,
2005). For example, an AFF4 URN might be urn:aff4:bcc02ea5-
eeb3-40ce-90cf-7315daf2505e.
The AFF4 model treats metadata as an abstract concept
which may exist independently from the data itself. We term
metadata to be a set of statements about objects, written in
tuple notations (Subject, Attribute, Value), where Subject is the
URN of the object the statement is made about. An Attribute can
be any kind of value or relationship, such as the sector size of
a device, a device capacity, or the name of the person who
performed an imaging operation. A Value is the value of the
attribute, which is either another URN, or some textual value.
Using this system we are able to store arbitrary attributes about
any object in the AFF4 universe. Additionally, as these state-
ments are universally scoped, they may be stored anywhere.
The AFF4 design extends beyond the management of
a single volume, stream or image to a universal system for
managing data of many types. This necessarily means that
a single running instance is generally unable to have visibility
of the entire AFF4 universe. For example, if a volume is opened
which contains a Map Stream targeting a stream stored in
a different volume, it is not generally possible to tell where
that volume is actually stored.
To provide this global visibility of metadata we define
a central metadata management entity, named the Universal
Resolver. The Universal Resolver contains all the metadata
about the AFF4 universe, that is to say it is able to resolve
queries for any attribute about any URN in the universe.
Although the resolver has complete visibility of all attri-
butes, it is still useful to store metadata within the volume
itself, particularly data pertaining to the volume itself. If we
did not store the metadata within the volume itself, then the
volume would not be accessible to implementations which do
not have this metadata.
To this end we define a way for serializing metadata state-
ments (or tuples) into a standard format which implementations
can load into their respective resolvers when parsing the
volume. Relations can be stored in segments having a URN
ending with ‘‘properties’’. The AFF4 implementation loads these
segments automatically into the Universal Resolver.
Relations are stored within the properties segment one per
line, with the subject URN (encoded according to RFC1737), fol-
lowed by whitespace and the attribute name. This is then fol-
lowed by the equal sign and the UTF8 encoding of the value. An
example propertiesfile foran Image Stream isshown inListing 1.
It is important to stress that the properties file is simply
a serialization of statements into volume segments. The
statements may exist without being stored in a volume (for
example, being stored on an external SQL server). Alterna-
tively, these statements may be stored in some other way
inside or outside the volume (e.g. SQLite database files).
When the volume is loaded, the AFF4 implementation
automatically loads any properties files and populates its
Universal Resolver with the information visible to it. AFF4
provides a mechanism to use an external resolver as welldfor
example, we have implemented a resolver that stores Attri-
butes in a MySQL database to provide for a persistent
Universal Resolver that shares information between different
instances on the same network.
Although the Universal Resolver should be thought of as
a truly universal entity, the library provides a local resolver
which is available to the running instance. As the library
explores different volumes, relations are added to the local
resolver. This means that the AFF4 library does not neces-
sarily need to have an ideal Universal Resolver, but can
approximate this by use of a local resolver. The local
resolver can be primed in advance by the user, by loading
various volumes which may be needed to resolve internal
references.
Each URN within the AFF4 universe must have an
‘‘aff4:type’’ attribute to denote the type of the Object.
Objects may also have a the ‘‘aff4:interface’’ attribute to
denote what kind of interface they present (e.g. stream or
volume).
5. Volumes
The volume object is responsible for providing storage for
segments. Segments are stored and retrieved using their
URNs. We describe two different implementations of volume
objects, namely the Directory Volume and the ZipFile Volume. It
is possible to convert from one implementation to another
easily, without affecting any external references.
It is important to emphasize that Volumes are merely
containers which provide storage for segments. There is no
restriction of which segments can be stored by any particular
volume. For example, the segments which make up a single
Image stream may be stored in a number of volumes (splitting
the image in some way among them). Similarly, the segments
representing a number of streams may be stored in the same
volume.
5.1. Directory volumes
The Directory Volume is the simplest type of volume. It simply
stores different segments based on their URNs in a single
directory. Since some filesystems are unable to represent
URNs accurately (e.g. Windows has many limitations on the
types of characters allowed for a filename), the Directory
Volume encodes URNs according to RFC1738 (Berners-Lee
et al., 1994); non-printable characters are escaped with a %
followed by the ASCII ordinal of the character.
The Directory Volume uses the aff4:stored attribute to
provide a base URL. The URL for each segment is then con-
structed by appending the escaped segment URN to the base
URL. Note that there is no restriction on what type of URL this
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can be, so it may be a location on a filesystem (e.g. file:///some/
directory/) or a location on a HTTP server (e.g. http://intranet.
server/some/path). In this way its possible to move the entire
volume from a filesystem to a web server transparently.
The Directory Volume stores its own URN in a special
segment named ‘‘__URN__’’ at the base of the directory.
5.2. Zip64 volumes
For AFF4, we have changed the default volume container file
format to Zip64 (Katz, 2007). There are many reasons for this
decision:
 There is already wide support for the Zip and Zip64 formats.
By migrating to these formats, we can take advantage of the
rich number of user and developer tools already available.
The volume may be inspected using any number of
commercial or open source zip application (e.g. Windows
Explorer natively supports Zip files as can be seen in Fig. 3,
Zip64 is supported natively by Java, Python and PERL).
 Zip64 libraries are readily available making proprietary
implementations of interfaces to the AFF4 volume format
simple to write. For example, a simple python program to
dump out an Image stream (Section 6.1) is illustrated in
Listing 2.
Fig. 2 shows the basic structure of a Zip archive. As can be
seen, the archive consists of a Central Directory (CD) locatedat the
end of the archive. The CD is a list of pointers to individual File
header structures locatedwithin thebodyofthe archive.Headers
are then followed by the file data, after it has been compressed
by the appropriate compression method (as specified in the
header). Each archived file is optionally followed by a Data
Descriptor describing the length and CRC of the archived file.
Using the data descriptor field allows implementations to write
archives without needing to seek in the output file. This allows
Zip files to be written to pipes for example, sending an image
over the network using netcat or ssh. AFF4 always uses the data
description header to ensure volumes are written continuously
without needing to seek in the output file.
Listing 1
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It is important to note that AFF4 only requires that the
volume be capable of storing multiple named segments of
data. Although our AFF4 implementation uses the Zip64 file
format as an underlying storage mechanism, our system also
supports legacy AFF1 volumes as well as Expert Witness
Evidence files (Kloet et al., 2008).
We ignore Zip64’s built-in support for splitting archives
into multiple Zip files. Instead, our implementation treats
each volume as a complete and stand-alone Zip file. The AFF4
implementation then considers the segments contained
within as belonging to the universal collection. This provides
the ability to split a stream across volumes automatically, as
different segments within the same stream may be stored in
different volumes.
Zip64 also defines encryption and authentication exten-
sions. We do not use them due to the restrictions imposed on
their use and because they lack the functionality that is
important for a forensic user. Instead, we use AFF4’s digital
signature facilities for integrity and non-repudiation, and we
introduce a new stream based encryption scheme for
ensuring data privacy (Section 6.4).
Although there are numerous Zip implementations avail-
able today, we have created our own implementation. There
are many reasons to develop our own Zip64 implementation
for AFF4:
 The commonly available Zip implementations written in C
do not implement the Zip64 extensions. These extensions
are required to support Evidence Volumes larger than 2 GB.
 Simple Zip implementations might rescan the Central
Directory for each segment request. Since in practice there
can be a large number of segments in a volume, it is advisable
to have a Zip64 implementation that is optimized to storing
thousands (or even hundreds of thousands) of segments in an
efficient data structure. In fact our implementation uses the
Universal Resolver itself to store the parsed central directory
information, which means that in most cases we do not even
need to scan the Central Directory at all.
 While the Zip specification duplicates data found in the
Central Directory entry in each File Header (such as filename,
size, CRC etc), many implementations that we have examined
only populate this information in one of these places. In the
interest of robustness, we wanted to ensure that data stored
in both locations would be populated to allow recovery of at
least some evidence that might exist in damaged volumes. If
the central directory is lost, it is possible to scan through the
volume, and locate all the Zip64 file headers. Then it is
possible to repair and reconstruct the central directory.
 Our implementation supports simultaneous access by
multiple readers and writers. Since our system requires all
metadata to be shared through the Universal Resolver, this
lends itself to providing Universal Locking on a per Object
basis. So for example, if one process wants to add a new
segment into a Zip volume, they can lock it via the Resolver,
add the segment and unlock the volume object in the
Fig. 2 – The basic structure of a Zip archive. Also shown is
how new archive members are added to an existing Zip
File. The Central Directory is overwritten by the new
member, and a new Central Directory is written on the end.
Listing 2
Sample Python code to dump out an Image Stream. As can be seen the chunk index segment is used to slice the data segment into chunks.







indexes¼ struct.unpack(‘‘<’’ þ ‘‘L’’ *
(len(idx_segment)/4), idx_segment)
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resolver, stopping concurrent access by other programs,
even on different machines.
6. Streams
The Stream system provides random access to an abstract
representation of a body of data. Our implementation allows
the segments in a stream to be operated on as if they were
a single file by supporting the traditional POSIX-like func-
tionality of open(), seek(), write(), and read(). All streams
also have a ‘‘size’’ attribute to denote the last byte address-
able within the stream. This is required in order to support the
POSIX whence attribute which may require seeking from the
end of the stream.
The following sections describe a number of types of
streams. It is important to note that clients of our imple-
mentation do not care how a particular stream is imple-
mented. Streams are opened by their URNs, and the library
itself ensures they provide the Stream interface. So for
example, users do not care if a stream is a Map Stream or an
Image Streamdthe interface provided is the same.
6.1. The image stream
The AFF4 Image Stream stores a single read-only forensic data
set. For example, this stream might contains a hard disk
image, a memory image or a network capture (in PCAP
format). Image streams have an aff4:type attribute of image.
Storage for the data is done by using multiple data
segments stored on various volumes. Data segment URNs are
derived by appending an 8 digit, zero padded decimal integer
representation of an incrementing id to the stream URN
(e.g. ‘‘urn:aff4:83a3d6db-85d5/00000032’’). Each data segment
is called a bevy and stores a number of compressed chunks
back to back.
The chunk index segment is a segment containing a list of
relative offsets to the beginning of each chunk within the
bevy. The chunk index segment URN is derived by appending
the bevy URN with ‘‘.idx’’. This is illustrated in Fig. 4.
Image streams specify the chunk_size attribute, as the
number of image bytes each chunk contains (chunk size
defaults to 32 kb). Also specified is the chunks_per_segment
attribute which specifies how many chunks are stored in each
bevy. Each chunk is compressed individually using the zlib
compress algorithm. This general structure of storing chunks
within larger segments is similar to the technique used by the
Expert Witness file format (EWF) used by EnCase (Keightley,
2003) and implemented by the open source libewf (Kloet et al.,
2008) package. This improvement from AFF1’s 16 MB segment
size results in a better match between requested size and the
minimum size required for decompression. Less data is needed
to be decompressed unnecessarily where reading small sectors
randomly, leading to vast performance improvements.
6.2. The map stream
Linear transformations of data are commonplace in forensic
analysis. For example, a file is often simply a collection of bytes
drawn from an image, while a TCP/IP stream is simply a collec-
tion of payloads from selected network packets. Sometimes the
same data may be viewed in a number of waysdfor example
a Virtual Address Space is a mapping of the Physical Address
Space through a page table transformation (Tanenbaum, 2008).
Zero storage carving (2006) is a way of specifying carved files in
terms of a sequence of blocks taken from the image; Cohen
extended this concept to an arbitrary mapping function (Cohen,
2008b, 2007) which can be used to describe arbitrary mappings
of carved files within a single image.
In this work we extend the mapping function concept to
allow a single map to draw data from arbitrary streams (called
targets). This transform is implemented via the Map stream.
The mapping function is described in a segment named by
appending ‘‘/map’’ to the stream URN. The segment data
consists of a series of lines, each containing a stream offset,
a target offset and a target URN. Offsets are encoded using
decimal notation.
Denoting the stream offset by x, and the target offset by y,
the Map specifies a set of points (Xi, Yi, Ti). Read requests for
a byte at a mapped stream offset x can then be satisfied by
reading a byte from target Ti at offset y given by:
y ¼ ðx  XiÞ þ Yi cx˛½Xi;Xiþ1Þ (1)
For example, consider the following map:
To read this stream we satisfy read requests of offsets
between 0 and 4095 in the stream from offset 0 to offset
Fig. 4 – The structure of Image Stream Bevies. Each bevy is
a collection of compressed chunks stored back to back.
Relative chunk offsets are stored in the chunk index
segment.
Fig. 3 – An Image stream browsed from Windows Explorer.
Basic access to the evidence volume can be made using
familiar tools improving transparency.
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4095 in urn:aff4:83a3d6db-85d5. Requests for bytes between
4096 and 8191 are fetched from urn:aff4:f901be8e-d4b2 from
offset 10000. Finally bytes after 8192 (until the specified size
of the stream) are fetched from offset 5000 in urn:af-
f4:83a3d6db-85d5.
In order to efficiently express periodic maps such as those
found in RAID arrays, the Map stream may be provided with
two optional parameters: a target_period (Tp), and stream_period






x0 :¼ modx; Sp

y :¼ ðx0  XiÞ þ Yi þ p  Tp
Where mod is the modulus function and floor signifies integer
division. For example consider Listing 3, which corresponds to
a 3 disk RAID-5 array.
6.3. The HTTP stream
Arguably the most ubiquitous protocol for information
sharing is the HTTP protocol (Fielding et al., 1999). The
protocol features mature authentication and auditing and is
fast and easy to set up with numerous web server imple-
mentations available on the market. The HTTP protocol is also
designed to operate across a wide range of network architec-
tures and is therefore more deployable than traditional file
sharing protocols.
For these reasons it is desirable to allow the HTTP protocol
to be used in facilitating the sharing of evidence files between
investigators. Luckily, the HTTP protocol fits naturally within
the URN based scheme adopted by AFF4, since the HTTP
Universal Resource Locator (URL) scheme is a subset of the
URN scheme.
For this reason, URLs may be used interchangeably with
a URN within the AFF4 universe. For example, the aff4:stored
attribute of a volume may be specified as a URL (e.g. http://
intranet/123453/). AFF4 provides transparent support for
HTTP and FTP URLs by means of the Curl HTTP library
(Various, 2009). The HTTP Stream, therefore satisfies read
requests by making HTTP requests to the web server. We use
the Content-Range HTTP header to request exactly the byte
range the client is interested in. This allows efficient network
transport as we do not need to download unnecessary data,
we just request those chunks the client application requires.
Our implementation also enables direct writing to a HTTP
URL using the WebDav extensions to HTTP (Goland et al.,
1999). The HTTP stream also supports the File Transfer
Protocol (FTP) and HTTPS (Secure Sockets LayerdSSL) proto-
cols transparently, as provided by the Curl library.
6.4. Encrypted streams
Encryption is an important property in an evidence file format.
In particular, multiple streams may be present in the file set,
and often different access levels are desired. For example, for
evidence set containing both network captures and disk
images it may be desirable to limit access to streams based on
legal authorizations, even though the same set is distributed
to a number of people.
Although the Zip64 standard specifies encryption, it is not
suitable for our purposes since it encrypts each segment sepa-
rately, and does not specify a sufficiently flexible scheme (e.g.
support for PKI or PGP keys). Segment based encryption may
lead to information leakage when segments are compressed, as
the uncompressed size of the segment may be deduced.
AFF4 therefore introduces a new encryption scheme, the
Encrypted Stream. The Encrypted Stream provides transparent
encryption and decryption onto a single target stream. The
target stream actually stores the encrypted data, and read
requests fromthestream aresatisfiedbydecrypting therelevant
data from this backing stream. The encrypted stream itself does
not store any data at alldall data is stored on its target stream.
The Encrypted Stream may contain any data at all,
including disk images, network captures or memory images. It
is useful however, to store an entire AFF4 volume within the
Encrypted stream. This provides block level encryption for the
contained AFF4 volume (which might contain arbitrary
streams). This approach is illustrated in Fig. 5.
The result is that a number of AFF4 volumes are used as
Container Volumes to provide storage for Encrypted Streams.
The main Embedded Volume, which actually contains data is
stored within the Encrypted Stream, effectively distributed
throughout the container volumes. Note that the outer
Volume may contain several Encrypted Streams and therefore
contain multiple AFF4 Encrypted Volumes. Container
Volumes may contain non-encrypted streams as well, and
may implement different encryption schemes and keys for
each Encrypted stream. This effectively allows arbitrary
access policies to be implemented as only volumes which can




Fig. 5 – Embedding an encrypted AFF4 volume within an
Encrypted Stream. The container volume contains an
encrypted stream backed by an image stream which is also
stored in the container. Once the encrypted stream is
opened, the volume stored on its image stream is
accessible. Now it is possible to see the secret image
stream stored within the volume.
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6.5. The link object
Although the URN of a stream names it unambiguously in the
AFF4 universe it is difficult to use and communicate due to its
random nature. Most investigators would prefer to use
a shorter name which might well represent the image better
in their minds (e.g. a case name or warrant number).
A Link object has a aff4:target attribute. When the Link
object is opened, the object named by this attribute is
returned. This allows images with complex names to be
referred to via short, meaningful names. In practice both
Image Streams and Link Objects are automatically created by
imaging tools, so users can always refer to the Image stream
via the simplified Link name.
7. Identity object
AFF4 defines a Statement as a collection of relations, or
(subject, attribute, value) tuples. Listing 4 illustrates a collec-
tion of relations encoded in the standard AFF4 notation
(SHA254 hashes are base64 encoded).
The statement expresses a set of attributes of other AFF4
objects, and in particular the attribute of SHA256 hash is
expressed (but other attributes may also be expressed).
Digital signatures have been used in previous forensic file
formats (such as AFF1) to provide authentication and non-
repudiation of forensic evidence. In essence, a when a person
signs an object they are vouching for its authenticity. Simi-
larly, when a person signs a Statement, they are vouching for
its authenticity. This concept is similar to the Bill of Material
(BOM) from AFF1.
An AFF4 Identity object represents an entity, currently
described by way of an X509 certificate. The URN of an identity
object is the certificate’s fingerprint, and is therefore unique to
the certificate. Identity objects contain aff4:statement attri-
butes which refer to AFF4 streams containing statements. The
identity object also contains a copy of the certificate used to
sign the statements.
To verify the signatures, the AFF4 library loads the stored
certificate, then checks the signature for each statement. If
a statement is verified (i.e. deemed as correct according to the
identity), the relations within it are checked. Note that it is
possible for multiple identities to sign the same data.
8. Usage scenarios
In this section we describe how AFF4 may be used in various
situations. Since the AFF4 framework implements a distrib-
uted evidence management system, we demonstrate its use
by a fictitious multinational corporation with offices in Los
Angeles and New York. Each office has its own computer
forensics lab and is connected via a WAN.
8.1. Using distributed evidence
An investigation is conducted by the New York team. The case
relates to a hard disk Image stream stored inside a volume, in
turn stored on the NY evidence server at URL http://ny.wan/
evidence1.aff4. The team requires an analyst (Bob) in LA to
assist with their analysis. The LA analyst types2: This
command causes the local AFF4 implementation to:
1) Contact the universal resolver asking where ‘‘NY case 1’’ is
stored.
2) The universal resolver replies that it is a symbolic link to
a stream called ‘‘urn:aff4:1234’’ stored within the volume
‘‘urn:aff4:9876’’. Further queries reveal that the volume is
located at http://ny.wan/evidence1.aff4.
3) The local AFF4 library then directly accesses the volume at
the given URL. Note that the entire volume is not copied,
instead specific chunks are retrieved on an as needed
basis.
The overall effect is that the user in LA is able to directly
access the disk image specified using a friendly name, and
stored at a remote location easily.
8.2. Load redistribution
In the previous scenario, Bob becomes involved in this
case, and wishes to download the entire image locally to
http://la.wan/evidence1.aff4. The Universal Resolver now
has two possible locations for the same volume URN,
since there are two copies in existence. Based on pre-
determined distance metrics, the resolver directs requests
from Bob to the LA copy, while Alice is redirected to the
NY copy. This load redistribution can be used for optimal
management of evidence storage in a transparent way.
Analysts are not aware of where the evidence is physically
stored, and it appears as though all evidence is always
available.
If Alice’s local NY copy is now lost, Alice’s local AFF4 library
will fail to open the NY URL, and will automatically fall back to
the copy stored in LA. This will require access across the WAN,
Listing 3
A Map stream that corresponds to a 3 disk RAID-5 array. The
targets are URNs for the respective disks. Note that map coor-










2 Fls is the file listing command which is part of the Sleuthkit.
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which will be slower, but provides a kind of distributed fail
over capability.
8.3. Remote imaging
The NY IT security team has just responded to an incident on
one of their servers. Alice, the responding officer, wishes to
image the server. She types:
This command requests an image be created directly on
the evidence server (it will be uploaded using WebDav). The
image is signed using Alice’s certificate and key (which might
need to be unlocked). Note that Alice does not need any
hardware to obtain the image as it is done over the net-
workdshe therefore can respond rapidly.
Bob is an analyst in LA which specializes in filesystem
analysis. As soon as the acquisition is complete, the image
is available for Bob to examine. Bob does not have
permissions to create volumes on the NY evidence server,
so he types:
This creates a new volume on the LA server which contains
a set of Map streams referring to the original evidence. The
new volume is near zero cost but refers to the original image
(which is still stored in NY).
8.4. Rapidly converting a set of DD images
Many hardware devices are available to acquire hard disks
in the field. These often produce a set of uncompressed
images split at a certain size. It is possible to construct a Map
Stream which seamlessly reassembles the logical image from
all the individual disk images. The map stream may be kept in
its own volume, or appended to one (or all) of the image
fragments.
Similarly, each component can be compressed indepen-
dently into its own stream. A single map stream can then be
produced to combine all the component streams into a single
logical stream. This approach can take advantage of multiple
systems to actually do the compression in parallel as each
component is compressed independently.
8.5. Acquisition of RAID disks
Often disks in a system are grouped into RAID
devices, commonly RAID-5 or RAID-0. Previously, if disks
were acquired independently, they would need to be
analyzed using a tool which was able to reassemble RAID
devices.
With the AFF4 format, each of the disks can be acquired
as a separate Image Stream. Finally a tool such as PyFlag
(Cohen, 2008c) may be used to deduce the RAID map,
which can be appended to the AFF4 file as a Map Stream.
This Map Stream can then be opened by any tool to get
a logical view of the RAID, without the tool needing to have
explicit support for RAID reassembling. This approach
enables parallel acquisition of RAID drives, a feature long
desired to handle the vast quantities of data presented
by RAID.
8.6. Cryptographic management of evidence
An AFF4 archive may hold multiple encrypted volumes, each
in its own Encrypted Stream. Each of those streams is
encrypted using a different master key, and therefore can have
different passphrases, and can be assigned to different users
by encrypting the master key with different X509 certificates. It
is also possible for users to create non-encrypted volumes
within the AFF4 volume.
This can be used to enforce access controls in line with
current legislative requirements. For example, within the
same investigation different material is often obtained under
different warrants (e.g. wiretap authorizations are different
from search warrants). Therefore, different investigators and
analysts need different access to the different streams.
However, the analysts may still store the results of their
analysis in an un-encrypted form, or assign others permis-
sions to decrypt their analysis results, without providing
access to the underlying data.
This can be used in sharing meta data (e.g. Map Streams of
files of interest) between analysts, without needing to provide
access to the underlying data.
Listing 4
An Example Statement (URNs and hashes are shortened for illustration).
urn:aff4:34a62f06/00000 aff4:sha256¼þXf4i..7rPCgo ¼
urn:aff4:34a62f06/00000.idx aff4:sha256¼ ptV7xOK6..C7R6Xs ¼
urn:aff4:34a62f06/properties aff4:sha256¼ yoZ..YMtk ¼
urn:aff4:34a62f06 aff4:sha256¼ udajC5C.BVii7psU ¼
fls-i aff4 ‘‘NY case 1’’
aff4imager -i -o http://ny.wan/evidence2.aff4 \
-k http://ny.wan/alice.key \
-c http://ny.wan/alice.crt/dev/sda
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8.7. Logical file acquisition
Alice is responding to an incident on a critical corporate
server. Since the system cannot be taken down for forensic
imaging, Alice must resort to acquiring discrete files instead.
Alice is unable to install and run any acquisition software on
the server due to policy restrictions.
It is still advantageous in this case to bring discrete files
into the AFF4 evidence universe by acquiring each evidence
file using a unique URN. As explained in Section 3, segments
are AFF4 stream objects which are implemented by storing the
data in Zip archive members. It follows, therefore, that
a regular zip file containing files is also a valid AFF4 volume.
So a logical image of files, can be created by any regular Zip
compression program in the field. Once brought into the lab
these volumes are given a volume URN and imported into the
Universal Resolver to provide access to all the files within the
archive. At this stage digital signatures can also be added for
each logical file.
Alice uses windows explorer to obtain a Zip file of the files
of interest. After taking the archive back to the lab, she then
signs the files, and adds a volume URN, making the Zip file
a fully compliant AFF4 volume.
9. Conclusion and future work
This paper describes a significant enhancement to the
Advanced Forensic Format (AFF1). AFF4, extends beyond a file
format to describe a universal framework for evidence
management, offering significant new features such as the
ability to store multiple kinds of evidence from multiple
devices in a single archive, and an improved separation
between the underlying storage mechanism and forensic
software that makes use of evidence stored using AFF. This
improved system allows a single archive of evidence to be used
in a plethora of modalities, including in a single evidence file,
multiple evidence files stored on multiple workstations, and
evidence stored in a relational database or object management
systemdall without making changes to forensic software.
We have developed an open source reference imple-
mentation, but the AFF4 framework is simple enough for
competing implementations. We hope this simplicity
enhances AFF4’s acceptance and adoption as a standard
evidence management platform.
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